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ESSAY
Immigration Remarks for the 10th Annual
Wiley A. Branton Symposium
SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA*
Good morning.  Thank you to Richard Carlton and the Howard
Law Journal for inviting me to speak today.  Speaking at Howard car-
ries special meaning for me for a few reasons.  Like for many, my
ideas about social justice and race came early and in part from the
opinions of the late Thurgood Marshall, and so it is a privilege to feel
his presence at Howard and to have Cecilia Marshall, wife of the late
Thurgood Marshall in the audience.  Also in 2008, I had the pleasure
of teaching immigration law as an adjunct while working as a legisla-
tive lawyer in Washington D.C.  For all of these reasons, it is an honor
to be speaking at Howard School of Law.
This morning (despite the pressure that our panel comes right
before lunch), I am going to provide a “101” on the role of
prosecutorial discretion in immigration law, which is my primary area
of research and fundamental to understanding how the immigration
system operates.  Prosecutorial discretion is a largely invisible tool
that enables thousands, if not millions, of unauthorized noncitizens to
reside in the United States without fear from deportation.  It may be
characterized as invisible because prosecutorial discretion decisions
are largely connected to no action at all or as some call it, non-
enforcement.
A favorable exercise of “prosecutorial discretion” refers to a de-
cision by a Department of Homeland Security, or DHS, employee to
abstain from enforcing the immigration laws against a person or group
* Samuel Weiss Faculty Scholar and Clinical Professor of Law at Pennsylvania State Dick-
inson School of Law.  I thank the staff of the Howard Law Journal for their editorial assistance.
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of persons.1  A grant of immigration prosecutorial discretion does not
amount to a formal legal status but rather functions as a tenuous one.2
There are two or maybe three theories that lie beneath prosecutorial
discretion in immigration law.  One theory is economic.  The agency
has limited resources and deporting ten million people is not cost-ef-
fective (the agency has the resources to deport less than four percent
or 400,000 of the total removable population).  Therefore, the agency
should target its resources toward its highest priorities such as those
who present a risk to national security or a danger to the community.
The second theory is humanitarian.  There are scores of individuals—
young people pursuing higher education, spouses of U.S. military
members, single mothers acting as primary breadwinners and
caregivers, and migrant workers who left their families to build a life
for themselves—who are contributing to the U.S. in meaningful ways
and therefore, should be protected from deportation.3  There is a pos-
sible third theory that I might characterize as more political in nature
that occurs when the agency chooses to exercise executive power in
the wake of congressional inaction or action.
So what exactly does it mean to exercise prosecutorial discretion
and at what stage of the immigration enforcement process may it be
exercised?  While you might hear the term “prosecutorial discretion”
and associate it only with one action, or one form, there are in fact
more than twenty different kinds of prosecutorial discretion, some
with more fancy names than others.  One policy document issued from
the immigration agency in June 2011 lists the following examples, or
forms, of prosecutorial discretion:
• deciding to issue or cancel a notice of detainer;
• deciding to issue, reissue, serve, file, or cancel a Notice to Ap-
pear (“NTA”);
• focusing enforcement resources on particular administrative vi-
olations or conduct;
1. See, e.g., Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration
Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243–244 (2010); Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm’r of
Immigration and Naturalization Serv. on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion 1 (Nov. 17, 2000)
[hereinafter Meissner Memo] (on file with author); Memorandum from John Morton, U.S. Im-
migration and Customs Enforcement on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the
Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Det., and Re-
moval of Aliens 2 (June 17, 2011).
2. See, e.g., Wadhia, supra note 1, at 246.
3. Id. at 244–45.
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• deciding who to stop, question, or arrest for an administrative
violation;
• deciding who to detain or to release on bond, supervision, per-
sonal recognizance, or other condition;
• seeking expedited removal or other forms of removal by means
other than a form removal proceeding in immigration court;
• settling or dismissing a proceeding;
• granting deferred action, granting parole, or staying a final or-
der of removal;
• agreeing to voluntary departure, the withdrawal of an applica-
tion for admission, or other action in lieu of obtaining a formal
order of removal;
• pursuing an appeal;
• executing a removal order; and
• responding to or joining in a motion to reopen removal pro-
ceedings and to consider joining in a motion to grant relief or a
benefit.4
“Deferred action” is one form of prosecutorial discretion that has
received some recent popularity in light of a 2012 program called De-
ferred Action for Childhood Arrivals or DACA.5  A less ornate form
of prosecutorial discretion is when DHS refrains from filing a charging
document called the Notice to Appear with the immigration court.6
When this notice is filed with the immigration court, removal proceed-
ings are triggered and the noncitizen is all at once placed into an ad-
versarial forum at which the government has alleged him as
deportable and the immigration judge will hear arguments surround-
ing the noncitizen’s relief from removal, should any be raised.7
Think about the decision to file or not to file the Notice to Ap-
pear, even where it appears legally sufficient.  Thousands of dollars
are saved—labor from the trial attorney, time for the immigration
4. Morton, supra note 1, at 2–3.
5. For the requirements for DACA from USCIS website, see Consideration of Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. (last updated
Jan. 18, 2013), available at http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-
childhood-arrivals-process.
6. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 239(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2012); 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1003.13, 1239.1 (2014).
7. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14; For more information about the role of NTAs during the
prosecutorial discretion process, see New Report Calls for Improvements to DHS Notice to Ap-
pear Procedure, PENN ST. L. NEWS (Oct. 22, 2013), available at http://law.psu.edu/news/new-re
port-calls-improvements-dhs-notice-appear-procedure.
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judge, travel by all parties, time in detention if the individual is de-
tained and so on.  Likewise, the noncitizen is protected from the
shame of a court proceeding and happy receiving his justice in a qui-
eter or subtler way.  Another way DHS may exercise prosecutorial
discretion is to release a noncitizen from detention.8  Yet another way
DHS may exercise discretion is to move to dismiss a case after re-
moval proceedings have commenced or choose to not file an appeal
with the administrative appellate court, the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals, after the immigration judge sitting at the lower immigration
court has determined that relief should be provided to the person.9
Prosecutorial discretion enjoys a rich history.  The practice of
prosecutorial discretion has existed for as long as the immigration sys-
tem has operated but was first revealed in the early 1970s through
some case law and a lawsuit involving a well-known music icon named
John Lennon.10  In fact, one document, issued in 2000 by then INS
Commissioner Doris Meissner, included pages of information about
the theory of prosecutorial discretion and the types of equities that
should be considered in deciding whether a favorable exercise of dis-
cretion is appropriate—some of these equities include: residence in
the U.S., potential for an immigration benefit, and medical conditions
affecting the individual or his family.11  The Meissner Memo also of-
fers a good illustration of how guidance might be influenced by con-
gressional activity or inactivity.12  The Meissner Memo was issued on
the heels of the passage of two immigration laws by Congress in 1996,
which together resulted in a statutory scheme that severely reduced
the discretion once held by immigration judges and the federal courts
in determining whether a person’s equities or circumstances war-
ranted a pardon or protection from deportation.  The elimination of
this discretion coupled with the creation of new grounds for deporta-
tion created a situation that made the agency look bad in media sto-
ries and public forums, at which the unintended consequences of the
8. See, e.g., Morton, supra note 1, at 2; see also U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS EN-
FORCEMENT, 11064.1: FACILITATING PARENTAL INTERESTS IN THE COURSE OF CIVIL IMMIGRA-
TION ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES (2013), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/ detention-reform/
pdf/parental_interest_directive_signed.pdf.
9. See 8 C.F.R. § 1239.1 to .2 and 1240.15; see generally EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV.,
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2014) (providing more information on the Exec-
utive Office for Immigration Review).
10. Leon Wildes, The Operations Instructions of the Immigration Service: Internal Guides or
Binding Rules?, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 99, 101 (1979); see Wadhia, supra note 1, at 246.
11. See Meissner Memo, supra note 1, at 7.
12. See id. at 1; Wadhia, supra note 1, at 252–254.
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1996 immigration laws were showcased (consider: a mom stealing a
sweater and being labeled as an aggravated felony and barred from
relief despite the presence of children born in the U.S. and enjoying
lawful permanent residence or green card status for more than a dec-
ade).13  And there you have the possible third theory of prosecutorial
discretion.
After the 9/11 attacks, Congress was swift in their deliberation
about reorganizing the immigration agency (I know, hard to believe in
the wake of a sixteen day furlough and delay on immigration reform)
and in 2002, passed a bill called the Homeland Security Act of 2002,
which abolished the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
and transferred key immigration units to a new cabinet agency called
the Department of Homeland Security, or DHS.  DHS handles three
core functions—services, border protection and interior enforce-
ment.14  These functions have names and acronyms—Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border Protection (CBP),
and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).  So, you do
the coordination math—these three units all play “share authority” to
exercise prosecutorial discretion.
For the administrative law lovers in the room, appreciate that
nearly every document issued by the INS and DHS on immigration
prosecutorial discretion has been issued as a general policy statement
and without notice and comment rulemaking under the Administra-
tive Procedures Act (APA).  In fact, when the courts tried to litigate
whether or not the old Lennon rule (then known as an Operations
Instruction) was a substantive benefit or merely an act of administra-
tive convenience, the agency was quick to modify the rule to make
clear that its prosecutorial discretion policy confers no right or benefit
and, instead, acts solely as a convenience measure for the agency.15
Notably, prosecutorial discretion has historically lacked transparency.
This was first revealed in the John Lennon case when Leon Wildes
had to sue the agency before obtaining the files of some 1800 deferred
13. See, e.g., Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and
the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV.  1936, 1957 (2000); see also Shoba S.
Wadhia, Under Arrest: Immigrants’ Rights and the Rule of Law, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 853, 871
(2008).
14. Department Components, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/depart
ment-components (last visited Feb. 6, 2014).
15. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 553 (West 2014); Shoba S. Wadhia, The
Immigration Prosecutor and the Judge: Examining the Role of the Judiciary in Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion Decisions, 16 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 39, 41 n.4 (2013); see, e.g., Wadhia, supra note 1, at
248–49.
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action cases but continued for many years thereafter.16  I, too, went
through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) adventure that began
with a skeletal request in 2009 and evolved into a lawsuit with one
agency (ICE), regular communication with the FOIA office in the sec-
ond one (USCIS), and little to no movement from the third (CBP).17
And for the budding criminal lawyers in the room, appreciate
that immigration prosecutorial discretion bears some resemblance to
criminal law, which historically has considered prosecutorial discre-
tion since America’s founding.  Though the immigration law system is
a civil one, it retains criminal law-like features such as interrogation,
arrest, detention, the filing of charges, and in some cases a hearing
before an immigration judge with the government serving as a “prose-
cutor” and the noncitizen serving as the “defendant.”  At each of
these stages, DHS has the opportunity to exercise prosecutorial dis-
cretion.  Like with the criminal system, the decision by DHS to bring
and file charges against a person is a poignant stage in the enforce-
ment process.18
The resemblances between the two systems were illustrated by
early memos by INS like a memo published by Sam Bernsen in 1976
and the later one published by Doris Meissner in 2000—both of these
memos recognized that while immigration officers are not prosecutors
in the “literal” sense, they function as prosecutors in a  certain practi-
cal way.19  The Meissner Memo went one step further by explicitly
naming and referring to the United States Attorney’s Manual and the
federal “substantial federal interest standard” as a guidepost for the
immigration agency.20  Finally, both the civil and criminal systems
center the theory of prosecutorial discretion on saving resources and
public interest or humanitarian reasons.  Certainly, both systems have
a broad list of conduct that makes a person prosecutable or deport-
able, so the resource constraints are as much actual as they are theo-
16. See generally  Leon Wildes, The Nonpriority Program of the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service Goes Public: The Litigative Use of the Freedom of Information Act, 14 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 42 (1976–1977); see also Wadhia, supra note 1, at 246–248.
17. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Sharing Secrets: Examining Deferred Action and Trans-
parency in Immigration Law, 10 U.N.H. L. REV. 1, 4 (2012); see Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, My
Great FOIA Adventure and Discoveries of Deferred Action Cases at ICE, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
345 (2013); see also My FOIAs with DHS on Prosecutorial Discretion, available at http://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2195758.
18. See, e.g., Wadhia, supra note 1, at 268.
19. Meissner Memo, supra note 1, at 4; Memorandum from Sam Bernsen, Gen. Counsel, on
Legal Opinion Regarding Service Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion (July 12, 1976), http://
www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/service-exercise-pd.pdf.
20. Meissner Memo, supra note 1, at 4.
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retical.  There are some key differences between the civil and criminal
law systems, some of which include the lack of a sentencing stage in
immigration enforcement, the role of the victim in the criminal con-
text and the lack of major due process protections in the immigration
system like a court-appointed attorney, flexible rules about detention,
and detention without charges or notice, and others.21
Let me fast forward to the last few years and highlight the role
prosecutorial discretion has played during the Obama Administration.
Early on, the Administration made public announcements about com-
prehensive immigration reform and legislative solutions to the broken
immigration system.22  But the political landscape sharpened.  The
failure of Congress to pass the DREAM Act in 2010 was a setback for
the Administration and thousands of young people who would have
benefited from the bill.  In addition to the failure of the DREAM Act,
was the execution of deportation orders by the agency at record levels
and public statements by the Administration about the importance of
enforcement which one pundit called “enforcement on steroids.”23
Together, the demise of the DREAM Act, the inability of Con-
gress to push immigration reform over the finish line, and a record
number of deportations created a humanitarian crisis that activated
the Executive branch to consider administrative solutions in the form
of prosecutorial discretion. Beginning in late 2010, DHS published a
collection of memoranda to outline its civil enforcement “priorities”
and also identify the various factors that ICE employees and attorneys
should consider in deciding whether prosecutorial discretion is appro-
priate.24  The Administration received support if not pressure from
members of Congress, immigration advocates, Dreamers and law
professors to exercise its prosecutorial discretion.25
21. See, e.g., Wadhia, supra note 1, at 268–69.
22. For a sampling of President Obama’s public discussion about comprehensive immigra-
tion reform, see David Jackson, Obama Talks Immigration with Officials—But No Members of
Congress, USA TODAY (Apr. 19, 2011), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/
2011/04/obama-talks-immigration-with-officials-but-no-members-of-congress/1#.Ut1qK9Io5kg;
see also Julie Mason, President Obama Pushes Immigration Overhaul, POLITICO.COM (May 10,
2011), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0511/54696.html; WHITE HOUSE, President Obama
on Comprehensive Immigration Reform, http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/
president-obama-comprehensive-immigration-reform (last visited July 1, 2010).
23. Lost in Detention, FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/race-multi
cultural/lost-in-detention/transcript-11/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2014).
24. See e.g., Morton, supra note 1.
25. See A Sad Comparison: Napolitano’s DHS, Tougher Than Bush, AMERICA’S VOICE,
http://americasvoiceonline.org/press_releases/a_sad_comparison_napolitanos_dhs_tougher_than
_bush/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2014); Letter from the Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on Immigration to
Janet Napolitano, Sec’y Dept. Homeland Sec. (Apr. 14, 2011), http://arnolaw.blogspot.com/2011/
2014] 937
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Public interest over prosecutorial discretion peaked in June 2012
when President Barack Obama announced a policy termed DACA, or
“Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals.”26  DACA is a sort of de-
ferred action which itself is a form of prosecutorial discretion in immi-
gration law.  DACA has enabled more than 500,000 young people to
work and study in the United States with dignity and without the con-
stant fear of arrest and possible deportation.27  Critics have labeled
the memoranda on prosecutorial discretion and the DACA program,
in particular, as excessive and politically motivated.28
Whether or not DACA was created for political reasons, the pol-
icy itself is nothing new and dates back to the John Lennon rule called
the Operations Instruction.29  There have been concerns from both
immigration restrictionists and activists about the implementation of
the Morton Memos and the limitations of the DACA program.  Some
of these concerns include the fact that parents of Dreamers remain
vulnerable to deportation, young people with minor offenses that con-
stitute a “significant misdemeanor” are ineligible for DACA protec-
tion, and scores of parents with U.S. citizen children continue to sit in
immigration detention or scheduled for deportation.30  This situation
04/letter-from-senate-judiciary.html; Letter from Senator Harry Reid et al. to President Barack
Obama (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.scribd.com/doc/53014785/22-Senators-Ltr-Obama-Relief-for-
DREAMers-4; Letter from Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n and Am. Immigration Council to
Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, Dept. Homeland Sec. (Apr. 6, 2011), available at http://www.american
immigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/docs/AILA-AIC-Napolitano-4-6-2011.pdf; Wadhia,
supra note 17, at 28.
26. Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/tools/reports-studies/immigration-forms-data/data-set-
deferred-action-childhood-arrivals (last visited Mar. 23, 2014).
27. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://
www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%2
0Forms%20Data/All%20Form%20Types/DACA/daca-13-8-15.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2013).
28. See, e.g., Griselda Nevarez, Deferred Action Approval Rate Dispute Erupts Between
Center for Immigration Studies and USCIS, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.huff
ingtonpost.com/2013/04/29/deferred-action-approval-rate_n_3180073.html; Brad Plumer, Can
Obama Legalize 11 Million Immigrants on His Own?, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/08/22/marco-rubio-says-obama-could-legalize-11-
million-immigrants-on-his-own-is-that-right/; Hansi L. Wang, Deferred Action: A Bird in Hand
for Young Immigrants, CODE SWITCH (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/codeswitch/2013/
04/23/178669698/Deferred-Action-A-Bird-In-Hand-For-Young-Immigrants.
29. Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Department of Justice. Operations In-
structions. Regulations and Interpretations, Sec. 103.1(a)(ii) (1952, as revised 1979).
30. See, e.g., Dreamer, DACA Recipient Yoli Navas: “We Live in Fear Every Day,”
AMERICA’S VOICE (June 25, 2013), http://americasvoiceonline.org/blog/dreamer-daca-recipient-
yoli-navas-we-live-in-fear-every-day/; One Year Later: Report Shows Morton Memo Hasn’t De-
livered on Promises of Relief, REFORM IMMIGR. FOR AM., http://www.reformimmigrationfor
america.org/blog/item/1307-30one-year-later-report-shows-morton-memo-hasn-t-delivered-on-
promises-of-relief.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2014); Seth F. Wessler, Nearly 205k Deportations of
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is not tolerable.  Whether or not prosecutorial discretion can be a tool
that delays deportation, each of these injustices is worthy of
discussion.
CONCLUSION
Rather than offer possible solutions to each injustice of the immi-
gration system in my final few minutes let me share a few that are
specific to immigration prosecutorial discretion.
• DHS should increase transparency about the cases involving
prosecutorial discretion;31
• DHS should hold employees who abuse prosecutorial discre-
tion accountable and create more incentives for attorneys to do
the right thing;
• DHS should issue fewer Notices to Appear against noncitizens
who do not fit within the Administration’s highest priorities32;
and
• The Administration should recognize “deferred action” in the
law as a formal benefit by promulgating a regulation.33
Thank you.
Parents of U.S. Citizens in Just over Two Years, COLORLINES (Dec. 17, 2012), http://colorlines
.com/archives/2012/12/us_deports_more_than_200k_parents.html.
31. For more on this recommendation, see Wadhia, supra note 17, at 51.
32. For more on this recommendation, see New Report Calls for Improvements to DHS
Notice to Appear Procedure, PENN ST. L. NEWS (Oct. 22, 2013), http://law.psu.edu/news/new-
report-calls-improvements-dhs-notice-appear-procedure.
33. For more on this recommendation, see Wadhia, supra note 17, at 60–61.
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